Kjell Erik Lommerud
(), Trond E. Olsen
() and Odd Rune Straume
Kjell Erik Lommerud: Department of Economics, University of Bergen, Postal: University of Bergen, Department of Economics, Postboks 7802, 5020 Bergen , Norway
Trond E. Olsen: Dept. of Finance and Management Science, Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration, Postal: NHH , Department of Finance and Management Science, Helleveien 30, N-5045 Bergen, Norway
Odd Rune Straume: Department of Economics, University of Bergen, Postal: University of Bergen, Department of Economics, Postboks 7802, 5020 Bergen , Norway
Abstract: The international integration of regulated markets poses new challenges for regulatory policy. One question is the implications that the overall international regulatory regime will have for cross-border and/or domestic merger activity. In particular, do non-coordinated policies stimulate cross-border mergers that are overall inefficient, and is this then an argument for international coordination of such policies? The paper addresses this issue in a setting where firms must have access to a transportation network which is controlled by national regulators. The analysis reveals that while non-coordinated regulatory policies may induce cross-border mergers (by allowing the firms in question to play national regulators out against each other), this can nevertheless be overall welfare enhancing compared to market outcomes under coordinated regulation.
27 pages, November 30, 2005
Full text files
Questions (including download problems) about the papers in this series should be directed to Stein Fossen ()
Report other problems with accessing this service to Sune Karlsson ().
This page generated on 2018-02-08 01:05:17.