Scandinavian Working Papers in Business Administration

Discussion Papers,
Norwegian School of Economics, Department of Business and Management Science

No 2007/8: Harmonization of Corporate Tax Systems and its Effect on Collusive Behavior

Dirk Schindler () and Guttorm Schjelderup ()
Additional contact information
Dirk Schindler: Meteorological Institute, University of Freiburg, Postal: University of Freiburg, Meteorological Institute, Werderring 10, D-79085 Freiburg, Germany
Guttorm Schjelderup: Dept. of Finance and Management Science, Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration, Postal: NHH , Department of Finance and Management Science, Helleveien 30, N-5045 Bergen, Norway

Abstract: We study how harmonization of corporate tax systems affects the stability of international cartels. We show that tax base harmonization reinforces collusive agreements, while harmonization of corporate tax rates may destabilize or stabilize cartels. We also find that bilateral and full harmonization to a common standard is worse from society’s point of view than unilateral harmonization to a minimum tax standard.

Keywords: Corporate tax systems; tacit collusion

JEL-codes: H87; L10

28 pages, March 1, 2007

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