Eivind Stensholt ()
Additional contact information
Eivind Stensholt: Dept. of Finance and Management Science, Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration, Postal: NHH , Department of Finance and Management Science, Helleveien 30, N-5045 Bergen, Norway
Abstract: A very close link of G-S, the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem to Arrow’s "impossibility" theorem is shown. G-S is derived as a corollary: from a strategy-proof singleseat election method F is constructed an election method G that contradicts Arrow’s theorem.
Keywords: Preferential election methods; impossibility theorem
JEL-codes: D72
3 pages, June 12, 2008
Full text files
163938
Questions (including download problems) about the papers in this series should be directed to Stein Fossen ()
Report other problems with accessing this service to Sune Karlsson ().
RePEc:hhs:nhhfms:2008_012This page generated on 2024-11-12 04:36:01.