Annette Alstadsæter (), Elisa Casi (), Jakob Miethe () and Barbara M. B. Stage ()
Additional contact information
Annette Alstadsæter: School of Economics and Business, Norwegian University of Life Sciences, Postal: Norwegian University of Life Sciences , School of Economics and Business, Postboks 5003, 1433 Ås, Norway
Elisa Casi: Dept. of Business and Management Science, Norwegian School of Economics, Postal: NHH , Department of Business and Management Science, Helleveien 30, N-5045 Bergen, Norway
Jakob Miethe: Dept. of Economics, University of Munich, Postal: University of Munich , Department of Economics, Schackstr. 4 / I, 80539 Munich, Germany
Barbara M. B. Stage: WHU – Otto Beisheim School of Management, Postal: WHU – Otto Beisheim School of Management , Burgplatz 2, D-56179 Vallendar, Germany
Abstract: In unparalleled international coordination, more than 100 countries adopted the Common Reporting Standard (CRS), committing to automatically exchange information on citizens’ foreign financial assets. We study how heterogeneity in national CRS implementation shapes its effectiveness. Using data on cross-border bank transfers to Norway with unparalleled detail on hidden ownership structures, we find that cash repatriation from tax havens increases significantly post-CRS, but only from countries with vigorous enforcement. Relying on global data on cross-border bank deposits, we show that highly digitized tax administrations trigger twice the drop in tax haven deposits in response to the CRS.
Keywords: Global Tax Agreements; Tax Evasion; Financial Flows; Tax Enforcement
Language: English
47 pages, First version: November 13, 2023. Revised: September 27, 2024. Earlier revisions: February 20, 2024.
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