SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Business Administration
No 1999:2:
The Ultimatum Game Revisited
Jan Tullberg ()
Abstract: The starting point of this article is the result of one
ultimatum game experiment - one of many showing a huge deviation from the
predictions of micro theory. However, further analysis gives an explanation
of subject behavior that deserves to be seen as rational, if assumptions,
such as a total secrecy resulting in no effects on reputation, are
questioned. Responders' actual behavior can be understood as adjusted to
generally realistic reputation effects, and the choices of the Proposers
are surprisingly attuned to actual Responder demands. If seen in this
light, the subjects seem to understand the situation and behave
accordingly.
Keywords: Ultimatum; buffer; reputation; spite; altruism; (follow links to similar papers)
11 pages, April 29, 1999, Revised January 10, 2002
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